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The number of supervisory boards 
of Dutch listed companies of which 
an individual may be a member shall 
be limited to such an extent that the 
proper performance of his duties is 
assured; the maximum number is five, 
for which purpose the chairmanship 
of a supervisory board counts double.
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (III.3.4).
That it’s time to revise the belief that 
over-busy supervisory board member 
can have a detrimental effect on 
companies is one of the conclusions 
to be drawn from my recent research 
into the nature and impact of 
corporate governance. This resulted 
in the award of my PhD in March 
this year following the publication of 
Corporate Governance, Firm Risk and 
Shareholder Value of Dutch Firms. 
 Although the research is 
concentrated on Dutch f irms 
and continental European-style 
Supervisory Boards, the lessons learnt 
are just as relevant to, and applicable 
by, Anglo-Saxon corporate boards. 
What, after all, is a non-executive 
director (NED) but a member of a de 
facto Supervisory Board? 
 Whether they are called Supervisory 
Board members or NEDs, the function 
remains the same: to supervise and 
provide advice and guidance to the 
management board, drawing on 
the skills and experience gained 
elsewhere. I have experienced this 
directly during my own career as a 
Chief Financial Officer. 
Gut feelings
In my work life, I became increasingly 
aware of the effects of human 
behaviour on corporate finance 
decision making. I observed that 
the CEOs with whom I worked were 
relying on their experience and gut feel 
more often than on a rational decision 
making process. 
 I noticed that in decision making 
many unwritten rules of thumb were 
being applied. I experienced the value 
of informal contacts and the power 
of being part of a network. I could 
feel the intrinsic boardroom tension 
between members of a Supervisory 
Board and members of the Executive 
Board, at times vehemently arguing 
and challenging each other’s views. 
With human behaviour playing such 
an important role in a firm’s corporate 
governance and decision making, 
what would be the implications for 
that firm and its value?
 One instance involved the need for 
the installation of a new IT system to 
improve the risk management function 
at the company where I was working. 
After I had outlined the problem and 
possible solution to the President of 
the Supervisory Board, he pointed out 
that another company, where he was 
also a Supervisory Board member, had 
faced up to the same challenge in a 
similar manner, but made a number 
of mistakes during the planned 
and implementation processes. He 
recognised the issues immediately, 
and initiated a dialogue with that 
company which enabled us to avoid 
making the same mistakes.
Underlying fear
There is an underlying fear amongst 
regulators in the Netherlands, and in 
the Anglo-Saxon economies, that if 
Supervisory Board members are too 
busy they will not be able to keep 
their eye on the various balls they are 
responsible for following. A stream of 
literature contends that if they are too 
busy, the companies with which they 
According to recent research, the traditional belief that com-
panies could suffer in performance terms if members of the 
supervisory board have too many commitments elsewhere 
needs to be revised. 
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are involved have inappropriately high-
risk profiles. 
 The first step in my work was to 
compile a data set of Dutch companies. 
Once this was in place, I was able to 
begin analysing connections between 
different boards, people and financial 
institutions. I also built a number of 
risk metrics, separating, for instance, 
company-specific risk from market risk 
(beta). I then examined risk aversion, 
wondering if it would be possible to 
identify boards shying away from 
making risky decisions, and began to 
come to what some might feel to be 
surprising conclusions.
 As I have already noted, 
mainstream thinking has it that the 
busier Supervisory Board members 
are, the riskier their companies are. 
I have tested this accepted wisdom 
and have found that it is simply not 
true. There is no positive relationship. If 
anything, the relationship is a negative 
one. Double, triple, or quadruple 
functions on a Supervisory Board are 
a node through which risk is reduced. 
I believe that this fear is unjustified. Up 
to a certain level (as yet unidentified), 
the busier the individual Supervisory 
Board members are, the better it is 
for their companies. Their “busy-
ness” brings new skills, knowledge, 
perspectives and relationships. 
 This has clear and important 
implications for boards seeking to hire 
new members to plug any gaps that 
might have arisen in their own profile. 
They should be looking to recruit from 
the ranks of well-connected existing 
Supervisory Board members. You 
want them because they are busy with 
relevant matters.
 Coincidence of events and 
characteristics does not in itself, 
of course, prove the existence of a 
cause and effect relationship. The 
direction of any possible causality is 
a key concern in any serious analytical 
work. The introduction of a time lag is 
one of the features that make my own 
analysis viable in this respect. Except 
“…mainstream thinking has it that the busier 
Supervisory Board members are, the riskier 
their companies are.”
in truly exceptional circumstances, a 
corporate Board will not be changed 
overnight. Examining a company’s risk 
profile from year to year helps identify 
the relationship between individual 
appointments and subsequent 
corporate behaviour.
Regulatory initiatives
Trends in corporate governance and 
in the expectations that people have of 
Supervisory Board members or NED 
have changed and gathered pace in 
recent years. At the beginning of the 
millennium, a series of governance 
failures at US firms such as Enron 
and WorldCom, and European firms 
such as Ahold and Parmalat, caused 
a wave of regulatory initiatives aimed 
at improving corporate governance. 
The debate on corporate governance 
has continued to thrive since. Most 
recently, the OECD has stated outright 
that the financial crisis that began 
unfolding in mid-2007 can be attributed 
to an important extent to failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance.
 At the 2005 CGA Accounting 
Research Centre conference, it 
was stated that internationally, 
trends in corporate governance 
can be viewed from the perspective 
of board stewardship, operations, 
independence, and disclosure. The 
rules and guidance relating to these 
board activities illustrate a number of 
interesting trends. 
 First of all, there continues to be a 
move from guidance to regulation. In 
the US, this trend is being reflected 
primarily in the areas of codes of 
ethics, audit committee structure, and 
the separation of CEO and chairman 
of the board. The Netherlands still 
operates more from a principle based 
background and uses the “comply or 
explain” principle that allows firms 
to either comply with the Corporate 
Governance Code or explain why it 
deviates from the Code.
 Developments in a f irm’s 
governance are also visible in the 
board’s skills. Initial initiatives were 
aimed at improving a firm’s governance 
structure. However, in recent 
developments, greater attention is 
given to skills and ethics. This reflects 
back on the efforts of board members. 
 The overall effort required from 
board members continues to increase 
due to the increasing number of board 
meetings and the increasing number 
of subcommittee meetings they are 
supposed to attend. The enhancement 
of the roles and responsibilities of 
corporate boards has tended to 
heighten the natural tension between 
the dual roles required of these boards. 
They must be advisers to senior 
management, and carry a fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders.
 What is the next step? To me it is 
clear. If it is good to be connected, 
then what is the ideal number of such 
relationships? We do not know; that 
needs to be researched and tested. 
Perhaps a reader might think of taking 
this work to the next level.
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“…the busier the individual Supervisory Board 
members are, the better it is for their companies. 
Their ‘busy-ness’ brings new skills, knowledge, 
perspectives and relationships.”
